A multi-scale model to evaluate airport wastewater surveillance and ICU genomic monitoring for pandemic preparedness

Benjamin K. Reddy, Joseph L.-H. Tsui, Kieran O. Drake, Guillaume St-Onge, Jessica T. Davis, Cathal Mills, Jake Dunning, Isaac I. Bogoch, Samuel V. Scarpino, Samir Bhatt, Oliver G. Pybus, Andrew Rambaut, Matthew J. Wade, Thomas Ward, Meera Chand, Erik M. Volz, Alessandro Vespignani, Moritz U.G. Kraemer
medRxiv
March 2, 2026

Increasing human mobility and population connectivity have intensified the risks of global pathogen spread, while concurrent shifts in human demographic patterns, ecological factors, and climatic conditions have altered the global landscape of this risk. Genomic surveillance can serve as a critical tool for early detection of emerging pathogen threats; however, challenges remain in deciding where to monitor, in understanding trade-offs among surveillance modalities, and in translating detections into actionable estimates of importation and local transmission for public health decision-making. Here we develop a computational framework to evaluate strategies for respiratory pathogen detection that integrates an established clinical surveillance modality, intensive care unit (ICU) sampling, with an emerging environmental modality, aircraft wastewater (AWW) sampling. Detections are translated into risk via a multi-scale, stochastic global transmission model that combines international flight data with a detailed agent-based local transmission model. The resulting model-based estimates contrast the time to pathogen detection via AWW at airports with that in the community via realistic healthcare testing pathways. Using real-world data from England and Wales (EW), we find that employing AWW in EW airports can improve first detection times by 12.5-37.7 days for a range of epidemiological parameters under realistic healthcare testing scenarios and random aircraft sampling between 25 and 50%. In particular, for a SARS-CoV-2-like pathogen, we expect AWW to outperform ICU in first detection timing by 22.0-25.6 days, with ∼21.9-42.6 times fewer cases at their respective time of detection. While false detection remains a risk, we show that follow-up confirmatory testing can improve detection confidence substantially. Together our results demonstrate the potential utility of AWW surveillance and how it can reduce detection times and improve global health security.

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